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Buyers are typically unaware of the full set of offers when making a purchase. This paper 
examines how international trade interacts with this problem of market intransparency. 
Sellers must communicate their offers through costly advertising, but cannot reach all 
buyers. Consequently, no market clearing price exists, and sellers randomize over an 
equilibrium price distribution. Letting sellers advertise their offers abroad leads to 
international trade, which would not take place under complete information. Buyers then 
receive more offers, leading to lower prices and welfare gains. Sellers in the model are 
identical, but appear heterogeneous due to their price randomization. In larger and more 
open economies, prices and markups will be lower, and exports are primarily realized by 
sellers who charge low prices. These predictions are similar to those of trade models where 
firm heterogeneity is assumed exogenously.  
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Information costs have long been thought to matter for international trade ￿ ows. Stylized facts of modern
trade, such as the consistent ￿ndings of signi￿cantly higher trade ￿ ows between countries with a common
language and the trade-promoting e⁄ect of ethnic networks, strongly support the hypothesis. To date,
however, theoretical treatments have been sparse. Against this background, Anderson and Van Wincoop
(2004, p720) conclude their review of the literature on information costs by stating that "More careful
modeling of the underlying information costs in future work will probably be illuminating."
This paper takes up the task. The point of departure is the observation that many real world mar-
kets are "intransparent": The information necessary to carry out an exchange, such as who sells, what
price these sellers charge and what the quality o⁄ered is, will not automatically reach buyers. Rather,
sellers spend considerable resources on advertising their goods. Modeling intransparent markets and the
associated advertising costs uncovers intricate interactions between international trade and information
costs. For example, in the model, the motive for intra-industry trade is generated by advertising costs ￿
if information could di⁄use costlessly, entering a foreign market would not be pro￿table.
Moreover, the analysis o⁄ers a new perspective on the role of ￿rm heterogeneity, which has been a key
issue in international trade since the seminal paper by Melitz (2003). When markets are intransparent,
di⁄erent pricing strategies are equally pro￿table. Even though sellers are identical, some will sell many
units at low prices, others will charge high prices and sell fewer units. The pattern is similar to the one
generated in Melitz (2003) by di⁄erences in productivities across ￿rms, as are the e⁄ects of international
trade on sector composition. The novel hypothesis o⁄ered by this paper is that some of the heterogene-
ity and variations in international activity observed in the ￿rm-level data may stem from similar ￿rms
following di⁄erent strategies.
I construct a model with two types of agents, buyers, who demand one unit of a good, and sellers,
who produce it. Buyers are initially unaware of the characteristics of o⁄ers, and sellers must therefore
advertise their o⁄ers. For expositional clarity, the focus is on homogeneous goods, where advertisement
reduces to price posting. In this interpretation, the model is intended to describe industries where goods
are relatively cheap, and where most buyers are primarily sensitive to price.1 Relatively cheap goods
imply that any gains for buyers of actively searching for o⁄ers, rather than passively evaluating o⁄ers
received, are likely to be outweighed by time costs.
The setup for the closed economy is adapted from the wage posting model of Mortensen (1990, 2003).
Sellers￿advertising technology is similar to the seminal advertisement model of Butters (1977). Adver-
tisement is non-rival in its form, one can think of sellers posting o⁄ers in mass media or in the public
1A few examples could be kitchen utensils, detergents, basic o¢ ce equipment, and also copyrighted goods with multiple
sellers, such as a particular book or recorded piece of music. As outlined in section 4, the modeling approach generalizes
to quality-adjusted prices of non-homogeneous goods, where advertisement must transmit more information than the price.
With this reinterpretation, the model covers any industry where goods are not tailored to ￿t individual buyers￿particular
tastes or needs.
1space. Even if sellers to some degree can segment buyers, this form of advertising inherently has some
randomness to it. As a consequence, if there are many buyers, it becomes too expensive for the individual
seller to reach them all. The randomness in advertising also leads to an ex post heterogeneity among
buyers: Some buyers receive o⁄ers from multiple sellers and can select the best one, others receive no o⁄er
at all.
In this setting, there is no equilibrium price on the market: sellers will either want to price lower than
other sellers, or to price higher, hoping that the buyer gets no better o⁄er. The equilibrium outcome is a
price distribution with no mass points, over which sellers randomize their price. Each seller thus charges
a di⁄erent price, although the good is homogeneous. The price dispersion is sustained by unfortunate
buyers, who, upon receiving only one expensive o⁄er, have no better option for purchase.
When sellers are able to contact buyers abroad, there will be two-way international trade in the
model. The export market presents an entirely new set of buyers to sellers, and initially there is no risk
of reaching the same buyer twice with the advertising campaign. The net implication of international
trade is an increase in the average number of o⁄ers that a buyer learns about and a downward shift in the
price distribution. International trade pushes the model towards the Bertrand equilibrium, to the bene￿t
of buyers. Were it not for the information frictions, there would be no reason for international trade to
occur, as both countries would be in Bertrand equilibrium already.
Associated with the information costs is therefore a new gain from international trade, a transparency
gain: Buyers gain from receiving more information and from the subsequent intensi￿ed price competition.
The closest parallel in the trade literature is the gain from trade put forward by the Cournot models of
Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983), where welfare gains arise from the strategic responses
of ￿rms when the economy is opened.
International advertisement is likely to be easier between countries that share languages. Lower costs
of export advertising will enable sellers to export more, the model thus presents an explicit channel for the
well-established result that countries with shared languages trade more, see Melitz (2008) for a detailed
empirical treatment.
Price dispersion, even for homogeneous goods or within speci￿c brands, is a consistent ￿nding in
economics. It has been documented empirically by, among others, Stigler (1961) and Pratt, Wire and
Zeckhauser (1979); Clay et al. (2001) and Feenstra and Shapiro (2003) document that the phenomenon
has not disappeared in the internet age. A rich theoretical literature has put forward di⁄erent explanations
for how price dispersion may occur, Butters (1977) and Burdett and Judd (1983) are seminal papers, see
Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2006) for a recent review.
The result that information costs may encourage international trade di⁄ers markedly from Arkolarkis
(2008), which to my knowledge is the only other paper modeling information costs of international trade
explicitly. Arkolakis (2008) shares a building block with this paper, advertisement costs in line with
Butters (1977). The crucial di⁄erence is speci￿cation of demand; Arkolakis (2008) builds on a love-
2of-variety model. To draw lines sharply: Suppose a buyer receives advertisement about ￿ve di⁄erent
tumble-driers. In Arkolakis (2008), the buyer would purchase all ￿ve, in this paper the buyer selects the
best of the ￿ve o⁄ers.
The next section sets up the model for the closed economy, the economy is opened in section three.
Section four features a discussion of the model￿ s predictions and how they may be tested, along with
extensions to quality di⁄erences and additional forms of trade costs. Concluding remarks follow in the
￿nal section.
2 The Closed Economy
There are n buyers, m sellers and one homogenous good. Buyers can either be thought of as consumers, or
as ￿rms wishing to buy an intermediate input. They each demand one unit of the good and have common
reservation price of ￿ p. Sellers produce the good at marginal cost c, with c < ￿ p. Initially, buyers do not
know individual sellers nor the prices they are charging for the good, and they are therefore unable to make
a purchase. Sellers must inform buyers of their o⁄ers through advertising. The good is homogenous, and so
the only information buyers need is the price; advertising therefore reduces to price posting. Throughout
the analysis m and n are assumed to be large, there are many buyers and sellers.
The costs of price posting fall into two parts. There is a ￿xed cost, fv, of employing the relevant people
and have them design the advertising campaign. Thereafter, the cost of reaching k distinct buyers with
the campaign and thereby inform them of the price of the product is described by the function v(k=n).
Price posting hits buyers at random, so the seller is unable to take into account if a buyer has already
received o⁄ers from other sellers. Moreover, the campaign may hit the same buyer multiple times, and
this leads to convexity of v(k=n): The larger the fraction of the population reached by the campaign, the
higher the probability that resources will be wasted on reaching the same buyer twice, v0(k=n) > 0 and





> (￿ p ￿ c),
the cost of reaching the last buyer is higher than what the seller could potentially earn.2
The timing of the game is as follows: In the ￿rst stage, each seller chooses the scope of her price
posting campaign, k, and her price p. In the second stage, each buyer picks the best among the o⁄ers he
learns about. If a buyer only receives one o⁄er, he buys the good if its price is lower than the maximum
willingness to pay; if there are more than one o⁄er, the buyer will accept the cheapest o⁄er. In case there
are several o⁄ers with the lowest price, the buyer selects randomly among these. Buyers can only buy
o⁄ers they learn about, and actively searching for goods is assumed to be too costly.3
2The price posting technology does not have to be completely random. The modeling is consistent with sellers splitting
buyers into segments and advertising to some segments only. Buyers are homogenous, however: Sellers￿choices of which
segments to target are uncorrelated.
3A su¢ cient condition to rule out buyer search is that the expected cost of ￿nding an o⁄er through search is higher than
32.1 Price Randomization
The expected pro￿t earned by seller j, j = 1;2;:::m, is:
￿j(pj;kj) = Q(pj)(pj ￿ c)kj ￿ v(kj=n) ￿ fv; (1)
where Q(p) denotes the probability that a buyer purchases the good when the seller charges price p.
Prior to ￿nding the sellers￿optimal strategies for pricing and contacting buyers, it is helpful to consider
what the equilibrium must look like. Let F(p) denote the cumulative distribution of prices o⁄ered by
sellers. In equilibrium The following characteristic will then hold:
Proposition 1: Price dispersion (Adapted from Mortensen, 2003):
Any equilibrium distribution of price o⁄ers, represented by the c.d.f. F(p) is continuous
and has connected support with upper support ￿ p and lower support no less than c.
A formal proof is given in Appendix A. Continuity of F(p) implies that there is no equilibrium where
sellers set the same price. The intuition for this is quite straightforward: If a buyer receives several o⁄ers
with the same price, a seller will always want to reduce her price slightly and be sure that the buyer
accepts her o⁄er rather than selects an o⁄er at random. This undercutting does not continue, though: If
all sellers were to price at c, a seller can earn positive pro￿ts by setting p = ￿ p: the probability that the
buyer gets no other o⁄er is positive, since no seller contacts all buyers.
That the upper bound of the distribution must be ￿ p is also quite apparent: If a seller is charging the
highest price, she can only make a sale if the buyer gets no other o⁄er. Given that the buyer gets no other
o⁄er, she might as well charge him ￿ p.
Maximization of (1) with respect to pj and kj leads to the ￿rst order conditions:
Q0 (pj)(pj ￿ c) = Q(pj) (2)
and Q(pj)(pj ￿ c) = v0 (kj=n): (3)
In Appendix A, it is shown that all sellers will contact the same number of buyers, kj = k, indepen-
dently of the prices they are charging. This symmetry in price posting simpli￿es the derivation of the mixed
strategy equilibrium in prices. All prices o⁄ered must give the same expected pro￿ts, ￿ (p;k) = ￿ (￿ p;k),
or
Q(p)(p ￿ c) = Q(￿ p)(￿ p ￿ c): (4)
To derive Q(p), consider the number of o⁄ers a buyer receives, call it X. Buyers are targeted at
random, and so X must be binomially distributed: The probability of being hit by a given seller j is k=n
(for all j), and there are m sellers making contacts, which gives us the two parameters of the binomial
distribution. The expected number of o⁄ers a buyer receives will be their product, ￿ X = mk=n. When m
￿ p ￿ c. This condition is more likely to hold for relatively cheap goods. See also the discussion in footnote 5.
4and n are large (and k=n therefore small), the distribution of X can be well approximated by the Poisson
distribution:








The poison parameter ￿ will be key to the model￿ s results. It is equal to the expected number of o⁄ers
a buyer receives, and as will be shown shortly changes in ￿ will shift the distribution of prices. I will
hereafter refer to ￿ as the contact frequency.
As hinted in the reasoning behind proposition 1, there are two forces governing sellers￿choice of price.
The incentive to raise the price and earn a high mark-up, hoping that the buyer does not get a better
o⁄er, and the incentive to lower the price, increasing the probability of undercutting the other o⁄ers that
a buyer receives. The equilibrium distribution of prices o⁄ered, F (p), is the distribution where these two
incentives cancel each other out. For a given price o⁄er distribution, the probability that price p is the
lowest among x other o⁄ers is [1 ￿ F(p)]















Inserting (6) in (4) and using that F (￿ p) = 1 gives the distribution of prices that is consistent with sellers
earning the same pro￿ts:
e￿￿F(p) (p ￿ c) = e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)









F (p) has lower support e￿￿￿ p +
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿
c and upper support ￿ p. In equilibrium, sellers randomize
their price over [e￿￿￿ p +
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿
c; ￿ p] in such a manner that prices o⁄ered will follow the distribution
F(p). If the contact frequency ￿ tends to in￿nity, such that each buyer observes all prices o⁄ered, prices
will approach the Bertrand equilibrium: The lower support tends to c, and F(p) = 1 for all p > c, all
sellers would price at marginal cost.4 The price distribution is plotted in Figure 1 for two di⁄erent values
of ￿.
Figure 1 about here
The more o⁄ers buyers learn about on average (higher ￿), the more the incentive for sellers to undercut
other o⁄ers will dominate, and prices will be lower stochastically. As long as there is a positive probability
that some buyers only know one o⁄er ex post, price dispersion can exist in equilibrium, even though the
good is homogeneous. Buyers accepting unfavorable o⁄ers do not irrationally perceive these as superior,
they simply do not know of any better o⁄ers.5
4Even though there is price dispersion in the economy, there is no room for arbitrage: A third party, buying the good at
a price p0 > c with the purpose of resale would face the same information problem as the sellers and would have to perform
price posting on his own. This third party would e⁄ectively correspond to a seller producing at higher marginal cost, which
is unpro￿table relative to entering as a seller.
5Butters (1977) provides a discussion of allowing for buyer search in a related framework. If search is not too costly,
buyers will search if the o⁄ers they receive are all priced above a certain threshold ~ p. This will lead sellers never to price
above ~ p, the equlibrium now holding with ~ p replacing the reservation price.
5The price dispersion implies a "pseudo-heterogeneity" among sellers. In one extreme, a seller sets




c selling expected quantity of k. Observationally, this pattern is equivalent to the one
generated in Melitz (2003) by di⁄erences in productivities.
With the price distribution determined, the optimal number of contacts follows from the ￿rst order
condition (3). As any price o⁄ered gives the same expected mark-up, this condition reduces to




2.2 The Free Entry Condition
New sellers will enter until each seller has expected pro￿t of zero. Entry increases the contact frequency ￿,
lowering the expected markup and forcing each seller to reduce her price posting campaign. The process
continues until the average cost of price posting equals expected markup. Setting expected pro￿ts (1) to
zero gives exactly this condition:
e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)k = v(k=n) + fv. (9)
Combining this zero pro￿t condition with the optimality condition for k, (8), one gets





Under free entry, (k=n) must be at the level where the average cost of price posting is min-
imized, this happens where the marginal price posting cost equals the average price posting
cost. The fraction of buyers reached by the individual seller is therefore determined uniquely
by price posting technology.
With the price posting scope determined in Lemma 1, the contact frequency ￿ that prevails under free
entry may be found from (8) as
￿ = ln
￿














In markets with more buyers, the contact frequency will be higher. As a seller has a lower risk of
hitting the same buyer twice with the price posting campaign, she is able to reach more buyers at the
6same cost when the market is larger. With a higher contact frequency, lower prices and mark-ups follow
(stochastically), and larger markets will also attract more sellers. These e⁄ects of a larger market size
resemble those of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).
The contact frequency will be higher the less price posting the individual seller does. The reason is the
convexity of v(k=n): One seller spending a given amount of advertising will reach fewer buyers than two
sellers spending the same amount. From (10), k=n will be lower with a lower ￿xed cost of price posting.
The bene￿t to buyers from a lower contact frequency is twofold: Each buyer has on average more o⁄ers
to select among, and the proposed prices are stochastically lower. Welfare in the economy consists of the
consumer surplus (or "buyer surplus") accruing to buyers that pay less than their reservation price ￿ p;
sellers earn no pro￿ts in expected terms. Buyers receiving no o⁄ers are equivalent to buyers paying ￿ p. By
the law of large numbers, welfare, W, will be:
W = n[￿ p ￿ Eb(p)],
where Eb(p) is the price each buyer can expect to pay ex ante, before any price posting takes place.
In Appendix A, it is shown that Eb(p) = c + e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)(￿ + 1).
Proposition 2: Welfare and the intransparency loss
W = n(￿ p ￿ c)
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿ (￿ + 1)
￿
. (13)
Welfare is the Bertrand welfare level, n(￿ p ￿ c), scaled down by an "intransparency loss",
e￿￿ (￿ + 1) 2 (0;1), which represents how much revenue sellers can earn on buyers￿lack of
information. An increase in the contact frequency will reduce the intransparency loss and push
welfare towards the Bertrand benchmark.
3 Opening the Economy
The main insights of the model are more clearly exposed in a two-country world, but the model can be
generalized to any number of countries. Consider two countries Home (H) and Foreign (F), each country
having an industry with sellers and buyers of the type described in section 2. A country has nl buyers,
l = H;F, all with common reservation price ￿ p.
In addition to communicating their o⁄ers to domestic buyers, the ml sellers may now choose to contact
buyers abroad as well. The cost of posting prices abroad for a seller located in country l is described by
the function vx(kl
x=nh), where kl
x is the number of foreign buyers in country h reached by the campaign
(superscript h indicates "the other country", h = L;F and h 6= l. Subscript x signi￿es the foreign market








x=nh) > ￿ p ￿ c.
7Cultural and language barriers, along with geographic distance make price posting abroad relatively
more expensive: for any k=n, vx(k=n) > v(k=n). Because a given campaign scope costs more on the export
market, but faces a similar risk of reaching the same buyer several times, export price posting costs rise
faster than their domestic counterpart: v0
x(k=n) > v0(k=n) for any k=n. However, a seller can use some
common resources for the common and domestic price posting campaigns. There may be a ￿xed cost
of translating, modifying and launching the price posting campaign abroad, but it is lower than fv, i.e.
vx(1=nh) < fv.6
A seller in country l has expected pro￿t of:
￿(p;kl;px;kl
x) = Ql (p)(p ￿ c)kl + Qh (px)(px ￿ c)kl
x ￿ v(kl=nl) ￿ vx(kl
x=nh) ￿ fv (14)
The pricing behavior of sellers carries over from the closed economy:
Proposition 3: Pricing in the open economy
All sellers making o⁄ers in country l, both domestic and exporters from country h, will ran-
domize over the same price o⁄er distribution, Fl(p), given by




























The proof goes as follows: The purchase probability for a given price is the same whether the good is
o⁄ered by an exporter or a domestic seller, and the upper bound on the equilibrium price o⁄er distribution
is equal to ￿ p for both domestic sellers and exporters. The condition that any price on the support of the












(￿ p ￿ c)kh
x (16)











(￿ p ￿ c)kl
for domestic sellers in l. These two conditions both lead to (15).
The domestic and export price posting scopes are set to maximize (14). A seller in l thus sets her







(￿ p ￿ c), (17)
whereas the export price posting scope kl
x satis￿es
6Introducing additional per-unit trade costs into the model is possible, but cumbersome. For clarity, they are left out. A









(￿ p ￿ c); (18)
the expected markups have been inserted in both expressions. It follows that the values for kl and kl
x do









which implies that kl > kh
x: A domestic seller reaches more consumers with her price posting campaign
than a foreign seller.
With price posting scopes being equal across sellers, the contact frequency ￿
l for the open economy






Comparing with the closed economy contact frequency of ￿ = km=n, it is not yet clear whether opening
the economy will increase ￿. It may be that the import competition causes domestic sellers to contract
their price posting expenditures or exit to such a degree that the net e⁄ect on ￿ is a decrease.
3.1 The Free Entry Equilibrium
As for the closed economy, free entry implies that sellers must have expected pro￿ts equal to zero:
exp(￿￿
l)(￿ p ￿ c)kl + exp(￿￿
h)(￿ p ￿ c)kl
x = v(kl) + vx(kl
x) + fv (21)
The zero pro￿t condition, combined with the optimality conditions for price posting scopes, (17) and (18),















By the convexity of vx(kl







is negative, so, comparing to
(10), kl=nl decreases when the economy is opened. Sellers reallocate resources from domestic to export
price posting and reach fewer buyers on the domestic market. Lemma 2 summarizes the properties of the
domestic and export price posting scopes:
Lemma 2: Open economy price posting scopes
The equilibrium price posting scopes under free entry are uniquely determined by (19) and
(22) holding in both countries, as these four equations de￿ne four monotonous one-for-one






. From (22), the fraction of domestic buyers
reached by each individual seller is lower in the open economy. From (19), kl < kh
x, a domestic
seller still reaches more buyers in market l than do sellers exporting from h.
With kl determined, again by price posting technology only, but in a more complicated manner, the
equilibrium contact frequency under free entry can be found from (17):
9Proposition 4: Trade and the contact frequency








Since kl is lower in the open economy and v is convex, the contact frequency is higher in the
open economy. The increased contact frequency implies that price o⁄ers are stochastically
lower in the open economy ￿ (7) stochastically dominates (15) ￿ and that the lower price
bound is closer to c.
Because the export market presents a whole new set of buyers to the seller, with initially no risk of
hitting the same buyer twice, export price posting is on the margin both more e¢ cient and more pro￿table.
When sellers in both countries reduce their domestic price posting to ￿nance export price posting, the net
e⁄ect (in both countries) is therefore an increase in ￿
l. As buyers on average receive more o⁄ers, sellers
reduce prices. Although the mechanism is di⁄erent, this outcome is similar to how opening the economy
squeezes out unproductive ￿rms in trade models with heterogeneous ￿rms.
The equilibrium number of sellers can be found by combining (20) and (23) and solving the two



















Comparing with (12), it is ambiguous whether the number of sellers falls or increases when the
economies are opened. Import competition tends to squeeze sellers out, but it may be that the domestic
price posting expenditure falls su¢ ciently to allow the number of sellers to increase in both countries. In
itself, the number of sellers has no implications for welfare, what matters is the total number of buyers
reached by their price posting campaigns.
Sellers all expect the same pro￿t on the export market, but sellers setting higher export prices export
less in expected terms and are more likely not to carry out any export sales at all.
3.2 Trade and Welfare
Welfare in the open economy is found by replacing the relevant terms in (13) by their open economy
counterparts.
Corollary of proposition 4: Gains from trade
Welfare in the open economy is given by
















, is reduced, raising welfare towards the Bertrand level nl (￿ p ￿ c).
10The rise in welfare from the increased contact frequency captures two e⁄ects: Buyers bene￿t both
from having more o⁄ers to select among (increase in ￿
l) and from the lower prices now o⁄ered (downward
shift in F (p)).
Figure 2 about here
This novel gain from trade, which I have dubbed the intransparency gain, can be quanti￿ed. Figure 2






, as a function of the contact frequency ￿
l. When the
closed economy value of ￿
l is small, even if international trade only brings a modest increase in ￿
l, the
resultant transparency gain is high. On the other hand, welfare cannot rise over the Bertrand level. When
buyers on average receive six o⁄ers, the market is only 2% from the Bertrand equilibrium. Economies,
markets or sectors where the contact frequency already was high in the closed economy (for instance due
to a large number of buyers, as seen from (11)), have lower transparency gains from trade.
4 Discussions and Perspectives
The new motive for intra-industry trade outlined in this paper is therefore not omni-present: When buyers
already have good information on sellers￿o⁄ers, there is little revenue for potential foreign sellers to reap,
and export price posting may not take place at all. Moreover, some markets have institutions that ensure
full information to buyers, notably the futures exchanges where many commodities, such as unprocessed
metals and the main crops, are sold. The model presented outlines one of the bene￿ts of such institutions,
they remove the intransparency loss and the need to spend resources on price posting.
The transparency gain from proposition 4 is a result of the changed strategic reactions of sellers: The
open economy o⁄ers a broader strategic scope with the possibility of posting prices abroad, but also
tougher competition, since buyers now on average have a larger choice set, leading to more aggressive
pricing strategies. Arising from strategic interactions, the transparency gain is more closely related to the
"competition gain" in the Cournot models of intra-industry trade presented in Brander (1981) and Brander
and Krugman (1983). In these models, opening for international trade leads to reciprocal dumping, ￿rms in
both countries export their good. The present model may be regarded as a homogeneous good Bertrand
counterpart to Brander and Krugman￿ s Cournot model, although the mechanisms at play are rather
di⁄erent.7
Trade may be facilitated through lower cost of price posting abroad, represented by a downward shift in
vx(kl
x=nh). There are two e⁄ects of such a shift, they can be thought of as substitution and income e⁄ects,
7There is another model of intra-industry trade in a homogeneous good Bertrand setting, due to Cukrowski and Aksen
(2003). Trade is here driven by uncertain demands in both market and brings with it a "diversi￿cation gain", as risk-averse
￿rms can reduce their risk exposure by serving both the domestic and the export market. As sellers￿realized sales in my
model are stochastic, serving both markets also brings reduced revenue variance. Being risk-neutral, however, sellers do
not value this. Stretching the interpretation of their model a bit, Cukrowski and Aksen (2003) show a result regarding
incomplete information similar to this model: The driver of intra-industry trade is incomplete information, and, as in my
model, improved ￿ows of domestic market information is a detriment to trade.
11and their relative importance depends on how price posting costs change. For illustration, suppose export
price posting costs are reduced proportionally, to ￿vx(kl
x=nh), with 0 < ￿ < 1. The relation between








which clearly implies an increase in export price posting (the substitution e⁄ect), while the zero pro￿t















With lower export price posting costs, there is pro￿t potential for new sellers to enter, the income
e⁄ect is swallowed up by entry. Moreover, the new entrants force each seller to reduce her domestic price
posting. Both the income and substitution e⁄ects hence decrease kl=nl, and by proposition 4 the net
implication is an increase in ￿
l and therefore welfare gains.
This comparative statics exercise provides an additional insight: It is plausible that in countries sharing
a language or having similar cultures, foreign price posting costs vx will be closer to domestic costs v,
and therefore trade and the gains thereof will be higher. The analysis of this paper thus presents an
explicit channel for the well-known empirical result that countries with similar languages trade more, see
for instance Melitz (2008).
The IT revolution of the last two decades has provided sellers with a cheap price posting device, which
does not require any physical proximity to buyers. In terms of the model, the ascent of the internet
represents a reduction in both v and vx, with the reduction in vx likely being more pronounced. It is not
certain, however, that the internet will promote trade. Comparative statics allow for the possibility that
the drop in v is su¢ cient to remove the motive for export price posting. However, if vx drops from a
prohibitive level and approaches v, intra-industry trade is likely to increase. This pattern seems to apply
to the markets for books and compact discs, which prior to the internet were dominated by local retail
sales.
Recent research in international trade, with Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Gross-
man and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) as prominent examples, has highlighted how improved information tech-
nology enables ￿rms to internationalize organization and production processes. This paper suggests that
IT may also impact trade ￿ ows more directly by facilitating extra-￿rm exports.
4.1 Quality Di⁄erences
A natural extension of the model is to allow for vertical quality di⁄erences. The model is then able
to describe a much larger set of industries, now including for example domestic appliances, household
electronics, computers and other o¢ ce machinery, as well as standardized production machinery and
intermediates (common chemicals, for instance). The key characteristics of such industries are: Goods are
12not tailored to ￿t a particular buyer￿ s taste or needs; goods may represent a signi￿cant share of a buyer￿ s
income; and goods are to some degree experience goods, quality di⁄erences are typically hard to assess
completely before purchase.
The broader interpretation of prices also calls for a reinterpretation of buyer behavior and advertising
activities. Since these goods are relatively expensive for the buyers, it is worthwhile for the buyers to
actively search for o⁄ers. The time costs of searching for o⁄ers on light bulbs or tumble dryers are
presumably more or less equal, but the cost of buying the ￿rst, the best light bulb is much lower. A
natural assumption is therefore that in a quality-adjusted price-interpretation of the model, all sellers￿
prices are known to buyers. What buyers cannot know is their reservation price of a particular o⁄er, and
this is why sellers must advertise, otherwise buyers will not buy the goods.
Advertising in these industries often contains no information on price. The literature on experience
goods and signaling, with Nelson (1970, 1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) as key contributions,
has interpreted advertising in this context as credible signals of quality characteristics that buyers cannot
verify before purchase. Reinterpreting for my model, advertising now enables buyers to determine their
willingness to pay for a particular o⁄er.8 If a buyer sees an advertisement from only one seller, he will
purchase this seller￿ s good if the sales price is lower than his newly computed willingness to pay. If he
sees several advertisements, he will purchase the good from the seller that o⁄ers the highest di⁄erence
between reservation price and sales price.
The aim here is not to develop a full-￿ edged model, but to show how it may be constructed. I do
therefore not dwell on why sellers produce at di⁄erent quality levels; they simply do, for some exogenous
reason. I consider a ￿xed number of sellers rather than free entry.
A necessary assumption to retain the predictions of the homogenous good case is that the cost of
quality is proportional to its value: When a good has quality ￿, it implies that the buyer￿ s willingness to
pay for the good is ￿￿ p and that the marginal cost of producing the good is ￿c. A seller producing with
quality ￿ has expected pro￿ts of
￿(p;kl;px;kl
x;￿) = Ql (p;￿)(p ￿ ￿c)kl +Qh (px;￿)(px ￿ ￿c)kl
x ￿v(kl=nl;￿)￿vx(kl
x=nh;￿)￿fv (￿), (26)
where the costs of advertising may vary with quality.
A buyer selects the o⁄er observed that o⁄ers the lowest quality adjusted price, de￿ned as p=￿￿ p. The
purchase probability can be derived as in (6), Ql (p;￿) = exp(￿￿F (p=￿)), and sellers will still randomise
their price, with ￿￿ p as the highest price charged.The condition that any price, which a seller with quality
￿ charges, must make the same expected pro￿ts as charging ￿￿ p is
exp(￿￿F (p=￿))(p ￿ ￿c) = exp(￿￿)(￿￿ p ￿ ￿c).
The cumulative distribution of quality-adjusted prices follows:
8My model abstracts from heterogeneity in buyers￿preferences for quality, which is a key issue in the mentioned literature.









The optimal pricing strategy is to raise the price proportional to the quality of the good and then randomize
according to (27). International trade increases ￿
l, pushing the price/quality trade-o⁄s o⁄ered to buyers
downwards, with prices approaching the marginal cost of quality.9
Naturally, one can think of more sophisticated purchase processes, with buyers inferring or learning the
good￿ s quality through repeated exposure to advertisement, peer e⁄ects or observed sales. Advertisement
may spill over across borders, perhaps enabling some sellers to create an international brand for their
good. A particular seller may exploit his brand by expanding his product range (see Choi (1998)), giving
a demand-side angle for the emergent literature of multi-product ￿rms in international trade. Some
countries may end up being perceived as providing superior quality for particular goods (French wine,
German machinery, etc.). This paper hopefully provides a framework for further work on these issues.
Per unit trade costs have been left out so far in order to simplify the exposition. Conceptually, they
￿t in nicely as supplementary costs of delivering the good to foreign buyers. Whenever a seller has a
higher marginal cost, her incentive to undercut other sellers will be weaker. The implication is that
the equilibrium price distribution will split in two, with foreign sellers pricing in the upper part of the
distribution and domestic sellers in the lower part. This prediction, although somewhat extreme, is more
in line with ￿rms￿export pricing than the customary iceberg cost of exporting: Firms raise their f.o.b.
price when exporting to distant markets.10
The "knife-edge" prediction, where the price distribution splits in two, is also the reason behind the
above assumption that quality a⁄ects willingness to pay and costs proportionally. Interplays between
quality di⁄erences and trade costs would allow for less stark predictions, such as Alchian-Allen e⁄ects:
only high-quality products are worth exporting. Allowing sellers to have di⁄erent marginal costs due
to productivity di⁄erences would also lead to a further partitioning of the price distribution, and under
certain conditions, only productive sellers would export.
4.2 Empirical Considerations
Even though the proposed model has clear and testable empirical predictions, the data requirements are
substantial. One would need price data at the seller level, and ideally a natural experiment of reduced
advertisement costs. The studies of pricing by online bookstores by Clay et al. (2001) and Clay et al.
(2002), and of retailers vs online sellers of books and CDs by Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) come close to
meeting these conditions. Their ￿ndings seem in line with the predictions of the present paper. First of
9The optimal number of buyers to advertise to will vary with the quality o⁄ered, but does not vary with the price charged.
10The iceberg cost assumption is that for one unit to arrive at the export destination, ￿ > 1 units must be shipped, the
remaining ￿ ￿1 units "melt away" during transit. This assumption leads to the erroneous prediction that ￿rms f.o.b. prices
will either be lower on the export market or equal to the domestic price. See Martin (2009) for derivations and empirical
documentation.
14all, the internet has not led to perfect convergence of prices, price dispersion remainsm and it cannot be
related to di⁄erentiation: There are smaller sellers setting prices higher than amazon.com. Unfortunately,
none of the papers report how price dispersion evolves over time.
With the increasing availability of scanner data (see Feenstra and Shapiro (2003)), the prospects of
formally testing the model are good. Moreover, there is a shortcut to evaluating the importance of market
intransparency and indirectly test the model: A strong point in the model is that to evaluate welfare
relative to the Bertand level, one only needs to know the parameter ￿
l:.
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Data on the average number of o⁄ers a buyer receives are not available through traditional data
sources, but if buyers of a given product can be identi￿ed, it is straightforward to survey them on how
many alternative o⁄ers they considered before purchase. In computing an estimator of ￿, one must take





nl potential buyers that did not receive any o⁄er and therefore cannot be
sampled, but this correction should not pose any major problems. A low estimate of ￿, compared to the
number of sellers, would in itself provide support for intransparent markets.
5 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that the relations between information costs and international trade are not
as simple as one might expect: Information costs do not always reduce trade ￿ ows between countries. The
case treated in this paper, advertising costs, may in fact generate international trade. The more costly
advertising is, the less advertising is done by domestic sellers, leaving more pro￿t potential for foreign
sellers. International trade mitigates the problem of incomplete information and increases welfare.
The framework outlined here applies to any industry where goods are not tailormade for individual
buyers and where there is no market institution that resolves the information problem, such as a futures
exchange. Moreover, many of the stylized facts in international trade that can be generated with hetero-
geneous ￿rms models are replicated in the present framework, even though sellers are initially identical.
With its explicit treatment of information ￿ ows, the model predicts that countries with similar languages
will trade more, and it shows how improved information technology may boost international trade.
15Appendix A:
Proof of proposition 1:
Continuity of F(p) implies that the distribution has no mass points. Therefore, there is no pure strategy
equilibrium where all sellers o⁄er the same price. To see this, ￿rst observe that if all sellers o⁄er the same
price, the probability q that a buyer accepts the seller￿ s o⁄er among x other o⁄ers is 1=(1 + x). The































(The result, proven below that all sellers contact the same number of buyers also holds in this case)
Therefore, a seller can do strictly better by decreasing her price with " and being certain that her o⁄er
is accepted, k(p ￿ " ￿ c) > kQ(p)(p ￿ c) for " su¢ ciently small. If all ￿rms were to o⁄er p = c, one ￿rm
could instead o⁄er p = ^ p and earn positive expected pro￿ts, since the probability that this is the only
o⁄er a consumer receives is e￿￿ > 0.
A similar argument rules out any equilibrium where some strictly positive fraction of sellers set the
same price, establishing continuity of F(p). Connectedness follows from the fact that a gap, say between
p and p00, with p0 < p00, would lead to the contradiction ￿ (p;F(p)) > ￿ (p0;F(p0)) for all p 2 (p0;p00], since
F(p0) = F(p00).
The upper support must be equal to ￿ p: if a seller is certain that no higher price will be posted, she can
only sell the good if the buyer receives no other o⁄er. If a buyer receives no other o⁄er, the seller earns
the most by o⁄ering p = ￿ p: argmax
p￿￿ p
￿ (p;1) = argmax
p￿￿ p
ke￿￿ (p ￿ c) = ￿ p.
It is never pro￿table to o⁄er a price lower than c, as long as sellers make non-negative pro￿ts, the
lower bound will be larger than c:
***
Proof that kj = k, all sellers contact the same number of buyers:





where ￿ k is the optimal number of contacts when o⁄ering ￿ p. Inserting (3) in this condition gives




Di⁄erentiating the right-hand side with respect to kj=n gives v00 (kj=n)(kj=n), which is positive when
kj=n > 0. The function f (k=n) = v0 (k=n)(k=n)￿v (kj=n) is monotonously increasing for (kj=n) positive.
It follows that kj = ￿ k:. In equilibrium all sellers contact the same number of buyers, and this optimal
number of contacts does not depend on the prices they o⁄er.
***
16Calculating Eb(p), the expected price that buyers pay:
The purchase probability, Q(p), calculated in (6) denotes the probability that all o⁄ers that a buyer
receives have prices equal to or greater than p. The complimentary event that at least one price is lower
than p has probability
Pr(at least one o⁄er has price lower than p) = 1 ￿ Q(p) = 1 ￿ e￿￿ ￿ p ￿ c
p ￿ c
.
The probability of receiving no o⁄er is equal to e￿￿.
If the buyer has received an o⁄er lower than p, it means that the price he paid for the good, call it
ppaid, is no lower than p:
Pr(ppaid ￿ p) = 1 ￿ e￿￿ ￿ p ￿ c
p ￿ c
This probability gives the cumulative distribution of the price buyers pay, call it Fb (p):
Fb(p) = 1 ￿ e￿￿ ￿ p ￿ c
p ￿ c
As buyers getting no o⁄ers receive no buyer surplus and therefore in welfare terms are equivalent to
buyers paying ￿ p, the cumulative distribution has mass point Pr(P = ￿ p) = e￿￿. The corresponding density
is given by
fb(p) = e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)
1
(p ￿ c)
2; and fb(￿ p) = e￿￿.




pfb (p)dp + e￿￿￿ p





2dp + e￿￿￿ p
Integrating by parts gives:






















5 + e￿￿￿ p
= e￿￿￿ p +
￿
1 ￿ e￿￿￿
c ￿ e￿￿￿ p + e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)
￿






c + e￿￿￿ p + ￿e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)
= c + e￿￿ (￿ p ￿ c)(￿ + 1)
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Figure 2: The intransparency loss
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